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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

RICHARD WILLIS JONES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070403-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, presiding. Jurisdiction is
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). See
Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when, following Jones' motion
for a directed verdict, it allowed the State to reopen its case for the purpose of putting on
evidence to establish that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County.
Standard of Review: "'A motion to reopen to take additional testimony when a
case has been submitted to the court, but prior to the entry of judgment, is addressed to

the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Daday v. R.D. Logging Co., Inc., 2003 UT App
125,2003 WL 21290516, *1 (quoting Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976)).
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 129:67-72, where Jones moved for a
directed verdict following the close of State's case and objected to the trial court's
decision to allow the State to reopen its case for the purpose of presenting evidence to
establish that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are determinative of the
issues on appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B.
United States Constitution Amendment V - Double Jeopardy;
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12 - Double Jeopardy;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (Supp. 2007) - Venue of Actions;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2003) - Presumption of Innocence.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Jones was charged by Information with one count of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony. R. 2-3. Under the Utah Code, it is unlawful
"for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006).
A jury trial was held on March 6, 2007. R. 129. During its case, the State
presented the following evidence related to where the alleged offense occurred. First,
Officer Kenneth Eatchel, the arresting officer, was employed by the West Jordan Police
Department. R. 129:12-13. Second, the alleged offense occurred at "8564 South Saddler
2

[Drive]." R. 129:14. Third, following Jones' arrest, Officer Eatchel took Jones to the
Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:18. The State then rested. R. 129:67.
After the State rested, Jones moved for a directed verdict. R. 129:67; see
Addendum C. Jones argued the State failed to present evidence that the alleged offense
occurred in Salt Lake County. R. 129:68. Specifically, he argued the State presented no
evidence that the Saddler Drive address was in Salt Lake County. R. 129:68. In
response, the State asked the trial court to take judicial notice that the alleged offense
occurred in Salt Lake County because Officer Eatchel testified that "he was a West
Jordan officer," that he "went to that address and that was where the defendant was," and
that he "took [Jones] to Salt Lake County Jail." R. 129:69, 70. Jones replied that an
explanation of "the officer's jurisdiction . . . wasn't part of the evidence," and that "the
location of the jail [was] really irrelevant as to where Mr. Jones was arrested." R. 129:70.
The trial court refused to take judicial notice that the alleged offense occurred in
Salt Lake County because he was "not enough personally familiar with this address to say
t h a t . . . it's in West Jordan which is in Salt Lake County." R. 129:69. Thus, the trial
court concluded, "there may be some question about. . . whether the venue is appropriate
here in the third district." R. 129:69. Instead, the trial court said it would allow the State
to reopen its case because the issue of venue was "not a critical fundamental issue in this
case." R. 129:71.
Jones objected because "the State has rested" and venue "was an essential element
that [the State] needed to prove and they haven't." R. 129:71-72. The trial court
overruled Jones' objection because, "It sounds like an oversight. I don't see any real
3

prejudice, and I'll permit the State to do it if that's what they want to do." R. 129:72.
The State agreed that it would reopen its case. R. 129:72.
When the jury returned, the trial court said, "The State has asked leave to reopen,
and I'll grant that motion, understanding, of course, the defendant has objected, but I'll
grant the motion." R. 129:73. The State then recalled Officer Eatchel, who testified that
he arrested Jones "at 8564 South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah in the County of
Salt Lake." R. 129:74. Jones did not cross-examine Officer Eatchel. R. 129:74. The
State then again rested its case. R. 129:74.
In its instructions to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that before it could
convict Jones of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, it had to "find from all of
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt" the following elements:
1. That on or about the 6th day of October, 2006, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the defendant, Richard Willis Jones,
possessed Methamphetamine; and
2. That methamphetamine was then and there a controlled
substance; and
3. That said the [sic] defendant did so intentionally and
knowingly.
R. 72. Following deliberations, the jury found Jones guilty of one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. R. 129:117.
On April 30, 2007, the trial court sentenced Jones to one "indeterminate term of
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison." R. 98. The trial court then suspended
the prison term and placed Jones on probation. R. 98-100.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following is a recitation of the facts relevant to the issue on appeal.
4

During presentation of its case, the State presented evidence that Officer Eatchel
was employed by the West Jordan Police Department. R. 129:12-13. On October 6,
2005, Officer Eatchel went to a house located at "8564 South Saddler [Drive]" in order to
arrest Jones on an outstanding warrant. R. 129:13-15. Jones was "cooperative" and
Officer Eatchel arrested him "without incident." R. 129:15. As part of the search
incident to arrest, Officer Eatchel asked Jones whether he had "anything that I need to be
concerned with." R. 129:16. Jones responded that he had methamphetamine in his
pocket. R. 129:16-17. Officer Eatchel retrieved a "plastic pill bottle" from Jones'
pocket. R. 129:18. He then transported Jones "to the Salt Lake County Jail." R. 129:18.
Thereafter, the substance found in the plastic pill bottle tested positive for
methamphetamine. R. 129:47.
When the trial court permitted the State to reopen its case, the State presented the
following additional evidence: Officer Eatchel testified that he arrested Jones "at 8564
South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah in the County of Salt Lake." R. 129:73-74.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Code requires the State to prove venue by a preponderance of the
evidence. If the State fails to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, the
decision to reopen a case in order to allow the State to present additional evidence is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court. A trial court abuses its discretion by acting
beyond the limits of reasonability.
In this case, Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion by reopening the
State's case in order to allow the State to present evidence to establish by a
5

preponderance of the evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County.
The trial court based its decision on its finding that the State's failure to present evidence
of venue was an oversight. This finding, if true, may have been an appropriate reason for
allowing the State to reopen its case. Contrary to the trial court's finding, however, the
marshaled evidence shows that the State's failure to present direct evidence of venue was
the result of a conscious decision. Thus, Jones concludes, because the State made a
conscious decision to rely on circumstantial evidence of venue, rather than presenting
direct evidence, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the State to
reopen its case to present direct evidence of venue. Moreover, Jones argues this Court
should reverse because, absent the additional evidence presented after the trial court
improperly allowed the State to reopen its case, there was insufficient evidence to
establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN, FOLLOWING
JONES' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, IT ALLOWED
THE STATE TO REOPEN ITS CASE IN ORDER TO PUT ON
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING VENUE

Regarding venue, the Utah Code says, "Criminal actions shall be tried in the
county, district, or precinct where the offense is alleged to have been committed." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-202(1) (Supp. 2007). "All objections of improper place of trial are
waived by a defendant unless made before trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2); see also
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-201(5)(b) (Supp. 2007) ("The defendant may challenge
jurisdiction by filing a motion before trial.").
Regardless of whether the defendant challenges venue prior to trial, the State must
present evidence regarding venue at trial. jSee State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339, 340-41
(Utah 1955) (reviewing defendant's claim "that the state failed to prove venue and the
verdict of the jury [was], therefore, contrary to the evidence"); State v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d
618, 620 (Utah 1955) (same); but see State v. Miller, 2003 UT App 76, 2003 WL
21294704, at *1 n.2 (mem. decision) (briefly noting, in a footnote, that it "believe[s] that
the burden to prove venue vests only if venue is challenged before trial" (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) (1999))).
"A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1)
(2003). Although "[t]he existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the
offense," they must still be proved at trial. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3). Specifically,
the Utah Code says jurisdiction and venue "shall be established by a preponderance of the
evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3); see Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340 (holding venue
may "be established inferentially by circumstantial evidence," but it "must be done by a
preponderance of the evidence" (emphasis in original)).
If the State fails to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, the
decision to reopen a case in order to allow the State to present additional evidence is left
"'to the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Daday v. R.D. Logging Co., Inc., 2003 UT
7

App 125, 2003 WL 21290516, at *1 (mem. decision) (quoting Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d
496, 497 (Utah 1976)); see, e.g.. State v. Gregorious, 16 P.2d 893, 895 (Utah 1932)
(holding trial court did not abuse discretion by permitting case to be reopened following
defendant's motion for directed verdict); Daday, 2003 WL 21290516, at *1 (holding trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to "reopen the proceedings in order .
. . to offer an interrogatory response into evidence" because "circumstances indicate that
[party] had 'ample opportunity' to introduce the interrogatory into evidence during the
course of the trial, but chose not to" and reopening proceedings "would have necessitated
providing [opposing party] with an opportunity to rebut it" (internal citation omitted)).
In this case, Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion by reopening the
State's case in order to allow the State to present evidence to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. A
trial court "abuses its discretion by acting beyond the limits of reasonability." State v.
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,1J20, 153 P.3d 804 (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,
239-40 (Utah 1992)).
The trial court based its decision on its finding that the State's failure to present
evidence of venue was an oversight. R. 129:72. This finding, if true, may have been an
appropriate reason for allowing the State to reopen its case. See State v. Lawrence, 234
P.2d 600, 601 (Utah 1951) (noting that after defendant "moved the court for a directed
verdict on the ground that there had been no evidence of value of the stolen car," the
"State's attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and
supply the missing evidence"); Gregorious, 16 P.2d at 895 (holding trial court did not
8

abuse its discretion when, following defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the
State failed to present corroborating evidence, it allowed the State to reopen its case in
order to present corroborating evidence).
Contrary to the trial court's finding, however, the record shows that the State's
failure to present direct evidence of venue was the result of a conscious decision, not
oversight. When reviewing a lower court's findings, this Court will "apply the 'clearly
erroneous' standard." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54/f23, 147 P.3d 401. "A court's findings are
clearly erroneous '"if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court is convinced that a mistake has been made.'"" In re T.M., 2006 UT App
435,^14, 147 P.3d 529 (citations omitted).
The marshaled evidence concerning the trial court's finding is as follows. See
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57,^52, — P.3d — ("[W]hen
appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to marshal the
evidence." (citation omitted)).
1.

2.

During the presentation of its case, the State presented
the following evidence regarding venue:
a.
Officer Kenneth Eatchel, the arresting officer,
was employed by the West Jordan Police
Department. R. 129:12-13.
b.
The alleged offense occurred at "8564 South
Saddler [Drive]." R. 129:14.
c.
Following Jones' arrest, Officer Eatchel took
Jones to the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:18.
Following Jones' motion for a directed verdict, the State
argued the trial court should take judicial notice that the
alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County because
Officer Eatchel said he "was a West Jordan officer,"
provided "the address" where the arrest occurred, and
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3.

testified that after arresting Jones, he took Jones to the
Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:68-70.
The State did not ask to reopen its case in order to
present additional evidence regarding venue. R. 129:7172. Rather, the State accepted the trial court's invitation
to reopen its case after the trial court declined to take
judicial notice that the alleged offense occurred in Salt
Lake County. R. 129:71-72.

Jones argues this evidence shows the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous.
The record shows that the State had ample opportunity during the presentation of its case
to present direct evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. R. 129.
It also shows that upon Jones' motion for a direct verdict, the State was cognizant of the
precise evidence it had presented to the jury and believed this evidence was sufficient to
carry its burden. R. 129:68-70 (prosecutor listing its evidence related to venue and
asking trial court to take judicial notice that the Saddler Drive address was in Salt Lake
County based on this evidence). The logical conclusion from this evidence, Jones argues,
is that the State consciously decided to rely on the circumstantial evidence presented by
Officer Eatchel, rather than eliciting direct evidence of venue.
Thus, Jones concludes, because the State made a conscious decision to rely on
circumstantial evidence of venue, rather than presenting direct evidence, it was an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to allow the State to reopen its case to present direct
evidence of venue when its gamble failed. Instead, the trial court should have required
the State to suffer the consequences of its chosen trial strategy. See U.S. Const, amend.
V ("No person s h a l l . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb."); Utah Const, art. I, sec. 12 (guaranteeing right of accused person not to "be
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twice put in jeopardy for the same offense55); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)
(holding Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of allowing the
prosecution to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding); State v.
Jackson, 857 P.2d 267, 269 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting that it would be a "direct
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution55 to allow "the State 'two bites at the apple,555 by "permitting the State to
present its case, and if it loses, to present a stronger case55 (citation omitted)).
Moreover, Jones argues this Court should reverse because, absent the additional
evidence presented after the trial court improperly allowed the State to reopen its case,
there was insufficient evidence to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511 at ^[20 (holding a trial court's error requires reversal "if
absent the error 'there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
defendant.555 (citation omitted)).
In Bailey, the defendant "contended] that the state failed to prove venue and the
verdict of the jury [was], therefore, contrary to the evidence.55 Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340.
On appeal, our supreme court held venue had been "sufficiently established55 because
"[t]he trial court would take judicial notice that Panguitch is in Garfield County, and of
its location within the county,55 the testimony offered by both defense and state witnesses
"adequately established that the offense was committed at a point about one mile east of
Panguitch,55 and "[t]he testimony of defendant himself, as to his direction and line of
travel, leads to the same inference.55 Id. at 340-41. "From such testimony it may
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reasonably be inferred that the offense was committed in Garfield County, judicial notice
having been taken of the location of Panguitch within said county." Id. at 341.
Similarly, in InreJ.G., 2002 UT App 432, 2002 WL 31875656 (mem. decision),
this Court held that the State established the venue of Davis County by a preponderance
of the evidence where the evidence showed the "theft was reported to, and investigated
by, the Woods Cross Police Department," the informant "resided within Davis County,"
and defendant's "custodial parent resided in Davis County." J.G., 2002 WL 31875656, at
* 1; see also Mitchell 278 P.2d at 620 (holding State established venue by preponderance
of the evidence where evidence strongly suggested body, which was found in Cache
County, had not "been transported any considerable distance," and "defendant by his own
testimony, placed himself in Cache County when he stated he returned to Idaho via
freight train, which, at the time of this homicide, we may take notice, necessarily would
have to have traversed that county").
Conversely, in this case, the State presented insufficient evidence to prove venue
by a preponderance of the evidence. As explained above, the marshaled evidence
presented by the State regarding venue was limited to the following:
1. Officer Kenneth Eatchel, the arresting officer, was employed
by the West Jordan Police Department. R. 129:12-13.
2. The alleged offense occurred at "8564 South Saddler
[Drive]." R. 129:14.
3. Following Jones' arrest, Officer Eatchel took Jones to the
Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:18.
This evidence was insufficient to allow the trial court to take judicial notice of venue. R.
129:69. Likewise, Jones argues, it was insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the
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evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. As recognized by the
trial court, the Saddler Drive address is not readily recognizable as a Salt Lake County
address. R. 129:69. Moreover, there was no evidence presented to the jury explaining
the boundaries of Officer EatchePs jurisdiction or why Officer Eatchel took Jones to the
Salt Lake County Jail for booking. R. 129. Accordingly, Jones argues, the evidence
regarding Officer EatchePs employment at the West Jordan Police Department and his
decision to transport Jones to the Salt Lake County Jail does not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the offense occurred in Salt Lake County.
In sum, absent the evidence presented after it reopened its case, the State's
evidence was insufficient to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
because the trial court's decision to allow the State to reopen its case was an abuse of
discretion, this Court should reverse because the State presented insufficient evidence to
prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Jones respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
SUBMITTED this ]^_

day of October, 2007.

1&-L,

^Pf
LORI[J?SEPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 051907381 FS

RICHARD WILLIS JONES,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

ROBIN W. REESE
April 30, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
marlened
Prosecutor: COLLINS, CHOU CHOU
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 26, 1963
Video
Tape Number:
TAPE
Tape Count: 11:29
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/06/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Page 1

Case No: 051907381
Date:
Apr 30, 2007
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$10750.00
$9250 . 00
$7 02 . 70
$1500.00
$10750.00
$9250.00
$702 .70
$1500.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $300.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: (LEGAL DEFENDERS) ATTORNEY FEES
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation
& Parole.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1500.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Paae 2

Case No: 051907381
Date:
Apr 30, 2007
Parole.
PAY $1,500.00 FINE
PAY $300.00 ATTORNEY FEES
MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH AP&P
MAINTAIN STABLE RESIDENCE
COMPLETE SUBSTANCE ABUSE EVALUATION, AND TREATAMENT
COMPLETE COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING
FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS
Dated this

day of

/Q^Z^J?

fF3uL0£I CERTIFY TK
ORIGINAL Di
DISTRICT O'
OF UTAH.

OF AN
THIRD
iTATE

CTIOM OF JUDO

DATE:.
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T

M
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
Sec- 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (Supp. 2007)
76-1-202. Venue of actions.
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where
the offense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place
of trial, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county
where the offense is consummated.
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results that
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements
is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense
may be held in any of the counties concerned.
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the
time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county.
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in
another county, the offender may be tried in either county.
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any
county in which any act t h a t is an element of the offense, including the
agreement in conspiracy, is committed.
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or
attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county.
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be
readily determined in which county or district the offense occurred, the
following provisions shall be applicable:
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle,
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft h a s passed.
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall
include but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir,
whether natural or man-made.
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in
which he exerts control over the property affected.
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or
more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of such counties.
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which
the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, in the county in
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited,
(h) A person who commits an offense based on Chapter 6, P a r t 11,
Identity Fraud Act, may be tried in the county:
(i) where the victim's personal identifying information was obtained;
(ii) where the defendant used or attempted to use the personally
identifying information;
(iii) where the victim of the identity fraud resides or is found; or
(iv) if multiple offenses of identity fraud occur in multiple jurisdictions, in any county where the victim's identity was used or obtained,
or where the victim resides or is found.
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless
made before trial.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2003)

76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the
offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-501, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-501.
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THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

THE COURT:

4

it has, just leave it there.

5

THE WITNESS:

6

THE COURT:

7

You're free to leave, sir.
Thank you.
If the report has been received, and I think
Yeah, right there.

Go ahead.

Yeah.
Okay.

All right.

Any additional witnesses,

Counsel?

8

MS. SKINNER:

9

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
All right.

The State has rested.

10

Counsel, are you going to present evidence today?

11

MS. GARLAND:

I anticipate doing so, but before I do

12

that, your Honor, I have a motion to make outside the presence of

13

the jury.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

We'll take just a very short recess.

15

We'll ask you to remember the rules that I have explained twice

16

already.

17

the jury room?

Deputy, would you conduct them -- excuse me -- outside

18

(Jury excused)

19

THE COURT:

20
21

left.

All right.

For the record, the jury has

Go ahead, Counsel.
MS. GARLAND:

Thank you, your Honor, and this is for the

22

benefit of the record.

I am requesting a directed verdict of not

23

guilty based on a lack of evidence of possession of a controlled

24

substance.

25

would require further testing.

The testimony today was that the scientific method
We've heard that further testing
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was available and further testing was not done, and for those

2

reasons I don't believe that the State has established that

3

element that this was a controlled substance that we are involved

4

with here today.

5

not we were in Salt Lake County when Mr. Jones was arrested as

6

well.

7
8
9

I don't believe anybody testified whether or

THE COURT:

Okay.

Counsel, do you want to respond to

that?
MS. SKINNER:

Yes.

Your Honor, first of all, the

10

officer testified as to the address.

11

Salt Lake County, but it is a Salt Lake County address, and he

12

did testify as to the address at which he arrested Mr. Jones at,

13

the Saddler Way address.

14

He did not specifically say

In addition, Mr. Bechaver clearly testified that he

15

performed the standards test, that based upon his training and

16

his experience and what is required as the lab requirements, this

17

is methamphetamine.

18

the test that we use every day in Court.

19
20

It's a scientifically recognized test.

He's not required to perform any additional tests, and
he didn't in accordance to the requirements that he was given.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. GARLAND:

Go ahead, Counsel.
Your Honor, there's no evidence that this

23

was a Salt Lake address.

24

address, not that it was in Salt Lake County.

25

It's

THE COURT:

There's evidence that it was an

I guess I'll have to check that.

Did the
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officer testify that it was in West Jordan, do you recall 9

2

don't want him to --

I

3

MS. GARLAND:

That I don't recollect.

4

MS. SKINNER:

He did not specifically say that it was in

5

West Jordan.

6

he was given this address and that he -- he then went to that

7

address and that was where the defendant was.

8

to take judicial notice that that address is actually in Salt

9

Lake County.

10

He said that he was a West Jordan officer, and that

THE COURT:

I'd ask the Court

I don't think I would have any trouble

11

taking judicial notice that West Jordan City is in Salt Lake

12

Count, but I'm not enough personally familiar with this address

13

to say that I could take judicial notice that it's in West Jordan

14

City which is in Salt Lake County, so if that's —

15

concur and that that was the limit of the testimony, then there

16

may be some question about whether this Court has -- or whether

17

this is properly before the Court, whether the venue is

18

appropriate here in the third district.

19

if you both

So if you're both right and there was no testimony that

20

this was West Jordan City, I don't know that I can personally say

21

in other words that -- or take judicial notice that 8564 South

22

Saddler Drive is in fact in Salt Lake County as opposed to Utah

23

County or Davis County or Tooele County or some other county.

24

if -- what would you suggest, then, Counsel, if you agree that

25

you have not presented that evidence9

So
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MS. SKINNER:

Again, your Honor, it's —

the officer

2

clearly stated he's a West Jordan officer.

3

jurisdiction.

4

address.

5

and took him to Salt Lake County Jail.

6

can ask anything other than that we take judicial notice that

7

it's -- that it is actually in Salt Lake County.

8

doesn't have jurisdiction outside of Salt Lake County.

9

That is his

It was one of his officers that gave him that

He stated that that's where he went and arrested him

THE COURT:

So I don't know that I

The officer

Well, Counsel, do you have anything else to

10

say 9

11

focused on one.

12

so either one of them if you have anything further to say.

13

was the scientific method and the other one was --

And for both of your points, too, so that we're not just

14

You made two points in your motion to dismiss,

MS. GARLAND:

Yes.

One

Just simply going to the issue of

15

the officer's jurisdiction, that wasn't part of the evidence.

16

Secondly, the location of the jail is really irrelevant as to

17

where Mr. Jones was arrested.

18

THE COURT:

19

But you don't want to comment further on the

scientific principle —

20

MS. GARLAND:

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. GARLAND:

23

THE COURT:

scientific method?
I believe I've made my

—

You've covered that?
I believe I've covered that.

Thank you.

I'll deny the motion to dismiss on that

24

ground.

It seems to me that the witness who testified said that

25

there were three tests that he's trained and required to perform
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as a part of the certification -- the two color tests, which are

2

presumptive tests, that he performed those.

3

methamphetamine.

4

chromatograph/mass spectrometer and that confirmed the result.

5

He testified there was no need to check it against a standard

6

like heart medicine, which you had asked, because he had the --

7

he had confirmation it was methamphetamine.

8
9

They both indicated

He followed up then with the gas

I suppose you could argue that it may have closely fit
the profile of heart medicine or something else, but in my

10

judgment, at least, he's provided sufficient testimony from which

11

the jury, if they chose to believe it, could find that the

12

defendant was guilty.

13

On the second

point, my memory -- I don't remember

14

whether the officer talked about this being in West Jordan City

15

or not, but both of you agree that he hasn't.

16

because it sounds like an oversight to permit the State to reopen

17

to call the officer for that one purpose --

18

MS. SKINNER:

19

THE COURT:

I would be willing

Thank you.
—

and allow him to testify.

I don't want

20

to be seen as helping either side, but that's not a critical

21

fundamental issue in this case.

22

resolved, but I'd be willing to let the State do it.

23

Counsel, if you want to cross examine him further, you certainly

It's something that has to be
Then

24 I could.
25 |

MS. GARLAND:

Your Honor, I would object simply because
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the State has rested.

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. GARLAND:

4

I know.
And that was an essential element that

they needed to prove and they haven't.

5

THE COURT:

They have rested.

It sounds like an

6

oversight.

7

State to do it if that's what they want to do.

8
9

I don't see any real prejudice, and I'll permit the

MS. SKINNER:

Thank you, your Honor.

I would like to do

that, if I may.

10

THE COURT-

Okay.

We'll —

if you're both ready, other

11

than that -- I'll deny the motion, Counsel.

12

other than that we'll bring back the jury and resume the trial,

13

unless there's something else.

14

MS. GARLAND:

15

THE COURT:

16

And then, Ms. Garland, you'll be calling the defendant

17

If you're both ready

No.
Either of you.

Okay.

as a witness 9

18

MS. GARLAND:

19

THE COURT:

Yes, thank you.
All right.

We anticipate doing that.

While they're still coming,

20

you've both been given a copy of the suggested instructions, so

21

maybe after we've finished with Mr. Jones we can have you take a

22

quick look at it, see if you have any exceptions.

23

your exceptions on the record, and then instruct the jury and

24

argue.

25

We'll take

In any event, you both have a copy, I believe.
COURT BAILIFF:

Please rise.
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(Jury returned to courtroom)

2

COURT BAILIFF:

3

THE COURT.

4

Please be seated.

All right.

For the record, the jury is

back, and Counsel, if you'd like to call your witness, please.

5

MS. GARLAND:

6

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
I'm sorry, I'm sorry.

The State has asked

7

leave to reopen, and I'll grant that motion, understanding, of

8

course, the defendant has objected, but I'll grant the motion.

9

Counsel, did you have another witness?

10
11

MS. SKINNER:

recall Detective Eatchel.

12
13

Yes, your Honor, if we may just briefly

THE COURT:

Officer, if you'll come back, take your

seat, and just remember, please, that you're still under oath.

14
15
16

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. SKINNER:
Q.

Detective Eatchel, you previously testified that on

17

October 6th of 2005 you arrested Mr. Jones, the defendant, at 8564

18

South Saddler Drive

19
20

MS. GARLAND:
question, Judge.

21
22
23

—

This is a leading question.

THE COURT:
Counsel.
Q.

I'm going to object to the form of the

Why don't you rephrase the question,

I'll sustain that.
BY MS. SKINNER:

Okay.

Maybe I can just ask, when

24

you -- according to your previous testimony when you arrested

25

Mr. Jones, where were you when you arrested him9
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2

A.

It was at 8564 South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah

in the County of Salt Lake.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Yes.

5
6

MS. SKINNER:

9

Okay.

Thank you.

I have no further

questions.

7
8

And that is within your jurisdiction?

THE COURT:

Any cross examination on that point,

Counsel'7
MS. GARLAND:

No.

Thank you, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

Does the City -- or excuse me, does the government rest

12

You can take your seat, Officer.

at this point?

13

MS. SKINNER:

14

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Okay.

15

cart ahead of the horse.

16

Mr. Jones?

17
18
19

MS. GARLAND:

Now I'm sorry, we kind of put the
Now Counsel, are you ready to call

Ye s, thank you.

I'd like to call

Mr. Richcard Jones.
MS. SKINNER:

Your Honor, perhaps before he takes the

20

stand if we can have the evidence tes -- published t o the -jury or

21

at least removed from the stand.

22

THE COURT:

Oh, that's fine.

Why don't you collect it,

23

Counsel, and put it back into the pad caging.

24

problem if we publish it.

25

MS. SKINNER

I don' t have any

We can keep it (inaudible).

